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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 10361

EL PASO NATURAL GAS
COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S PE'TI'TION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETI1TION FOR REHEARING
COMES NOW Union Pacific Railroad Company,
plaintiff and appellant herein, and petitions the above
entitled court for a rehearing of the above entitled case
heretofore decided by opinion of this court made and
entered December 15, 1965. 'This petition is based upon
the following grounds :
1. This court erroneously held that the connection
or relationship between the existence and maintenance
of the pipeline, on the one hand, and Stacey's accident,
on the other hand, was merely a "remote" or "coincidental" one; and erroneously held that there was no substantial causational relationship between the pipeline and
the accident.
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2. This court erred in that it apparently overlooked
the most significant factual matters established in this
lawsuit bearing upon the nature of the relationship between the existence and maintenance of the pipeline, on
the one hand, and Stacey's accident, on the other hand.
3. This court erroneously held that the language
of indemnity involved in this case did not sufficiently
express a clear and unequivocal intent of the parties
to provide indemnity in favor of the appellant from respondent for losses due in part to appellant's negligence.
4. This court erred in that it overlooked the applicable law of the State of vVyoming governing proper
disposition of the issue mentioned in Point 3 above.
5. This court erred in that it placed reliance on
older decisions from courts of other jurisdictions which
are not currently acceptable even to the courts which
originally wrote or made such decisions.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH
A. U. MINER
HOWARD F. CORAY
SCOTT M. MATHESON
NORMAN vV. KETTNER
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant
Address : 10 South Main St.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING
PRELDHNARY STATEMENT
The facts of this case having been stated in appellant's original brief, restated in respondent's brief, and
in most respects again stated in the court's opinion entered December 15, 1965, there is no need to set them
forth here. However, mention should now be made of two
particularly significant facts relied upon by appellant in
support of its petition for rehearing for the reason that
the majority opinion of this court makes no reference to
them whatever; and this strongly suggests the same were
overlooked by this court. Those facts are that the private
crossing on which Stacey was injured provided the only
reasonably practical route by which Stacey or other employes of respondent could reach those certain portions
of the easement areas conveyed by the deed to which
Stacey was enroute when injured; and the ingress and
egress language of the deed shows conclusively the parties thereto did have that general subject in mind when
the deed was delivered and accepted.

ARGUMENT POINT I
Appellant's Points 1 and 2 of its petition for rehearing are so closely related that appellant's argument
in support thereof may be most briefly made by treating
them as a single unit. This court held that the relationship which existed between the existence and maintenance
of the pipeline and Stacey's accident was "remote" and
"coincidental"; and that there \Yas no substantial causa-
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tional relationship between these matters. This holding
overlooks: (a) that the crossing on which Stacey was injured afforded the only possible route which he could use
to reach the easement areas conveyed by the deed on
which a portion of the pipeline was located; (b) that the
parties had ingress and egress to and from the easement
areas in mind as shown by a provision to that effect in
the deed; so that ( c) the parties to this deed must necessarily have intended, and the actual conduct of those
parties shows conclusively they intended, that use of the
crossing by respondent's employes in maintaining the
pipeline was neither "remote" from nor simply "coincidental" with the existence and maintenance of the pipeline.
In its opinion this court agreed with appellant's previously espoused contention that the indemnity language
of the deed encompassed indemnity for losses due to some
type of causal relationship between the pipline and
Stacey's accident other than one of "proximate" or
"legal" cause; and also agreed that "but for" the pipeline, Stacey's accident with its consequent loss to Union
Pacific would never have occurred. However, this court
has refused to agree with appellant's further contention
that the language of the indemnity provision encompassed
losses, among others, with the very type of causal relationship which existed here. The court based its refusal
on its characterization of the relationship (some relationship being conceded) as "remote" and as "coincidental."
We acknowledge that it is difficult for this court,
or any other, to describe the nature of a relationship be-
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tween the two factors (the pipeline and the accident) in
a word or two and still express adequately the whole
process of the court's reasoning. And we do not quarrel
with the two words selected by the court in its effort
to describe its conclusion simply because the words chosen
are possibly a shorthand way of expressing the court's
total thought concept. But we do respectfully assert that
words such as "remote" and "coincidental" are mere adjectives ; that their use obscures rather than clarifies
the real problem in this lawsuit; and that their use seems
to indicate this court, albeit unintentionally, judged the
nature of the relationship between the existence of the
pipeline and Stacey's accident in terms commonly used
in considering, and significant only with respect to, cases
involving the doctrine of "proximate cause." For what is
there about such words from the indemnity language in
the deed as : "in any other way whatsoever is due to or
arises because of the existence of the pipeline," which
suggests that some "remote" relationship does not satisfy
their meaning? Even if event "B" is only "remotely" due
to phenomenon "A", can it be said "B" is not due to "A"
at all? And if "B" is due to "A" at all, is it not due to
"A": "in any way whatsoever"? If the "remote" test is
to be used despite the lack of any aid therefrom in decision of this lawsuit, then by what measure was or is it
to be decided the relationship between the pipeline
and Stacey's accident was "remote" or "coincidental" T
Is it to be decided solely by a measure of geographical
distance 1 Surely not, for if so this case is one for decision by a surveyor, not a court. If not by measure of
distance, then by application of what legal theory is that
conclusion reached or reachable? Is it by some sort of
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judicial instinct¥ Certainly that conclusion is not supportable by resort to the analogies used for illustrative
purposes by this court in its opinion, as will hereinafter
be pointed out.
Parenthetically we ask the court to note here this
appellant has never contended that absolutely every
cause in fact or "but for" relationship between the pipeline and an accident was sufficient to invoke the indemnity language of the deed. Please see the paragraph of
appellant's original brief beginning at the bottom of page
18 and ending on page 19. Instead, appellant suggested
at page 21 of that brief what we still think is the only
rational measure or yardstick by which valid conclusions
can be reached concerning the nature of that connection
or relationships, as distinguished from reaching those
conclusions through use of mere semantics. That suggested test, one of determining which hazards were contemplated by the parties when the deed was given, also
illustrates the precise reasons why the analogies suggested by the court are, in our opinion, inappropriate.
We could easily agree with the majority opinion
of this court that those who negotiated the terms of
the deed involved here were not thinking of, nor are they
to be held to have been considering, risks or hazards of
loss arising in circumstances where El Paso's employes
were hurt or injured hundreds or thousands of miles from
the easement areas while engaged coincidentally (if that
is to be the magic word) in some activity related to the
pipeline. But that situation is not analogous to the case
this court was and is called upon to consider. Here
Stacey was, at the very moment of his accident, on appellant's railroad property; using a private, not a public,
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crossing; and, most importantly, using the only practical
route which existed to reach some of the easement areas
conveyed by the deed. Surely there is some very real
difference between that situation and the examples conceived and mentioned by this court. The difference lies in
the fact that ordinary business men would not normally
be considered to have contracted with hazards of accidents occurring hundreds or thousands of miles away in
their minds; but the same ordinary business men should
very well normally be considered to have contracted with
those hazards immediately at hand on this crossing very
much in mind. Especially so since there was no other
practical route to the pipeline in that area. The question
therefore becomes : Is that difference sufficient to warrant a different answer than this court has given~ Solution of that question should depend, with all due and
genuine deference to this court's views and opinion, not
upon use of adjectives germane only to a "proximate
cause" case; but instead upon consideration of the intent
of these parties; that is whether or not the parties' words
and conduct were such as to justify the court in deciding
hazards at this particular crossing should be held to be
within the contemplation of the parties.
\Ve believe the "hazards which should be held to have
been contemplated by the parties" test, heretofore suggested at page 21 of our original brief and repeated here,
is the only measure of the relationship between the pipeline and the accident which is meaningful in this case.
But whether it is or not, and we ask the court to note the
total absence of any suggestion whatever made by respondent either in its brief or at oral argument as to
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what is a better test, we respectfully urge that decision
of this case simply by use of an indeterminate adjective
such as "remote" leaves entirely unknowable and unascertainable by what standard the court's decision was
reached.
We also respectfully urge it appears this court did
not give adequate consideration and effect to the fact
that the crossing involved furnished the only route to
the pipeline easement areas. At least that fact, established by the record at pages 47 and 164, is neither mentioned in the majority opinion of the court nor described
in that opinion as immaterial. Granting that this court
can never satisfy the desires of counsel as to the content
(let alone the result) of its opinions, does not a case of
this magnitude justify full analysis of a factor such as
this one which obviously has at least some bearing on
proper disposition of the lawsuit 1
This petition and brief is not filed merely to criticize
or belittle the literary qualities of the court's opinion.
It is, instead, intended to present appellant's vital contention that the fact this crossing was the only way for
Stacey to get to the pipeline, and the effect of that fact
upon (a) the analogies relied upon by the court, and (b)
upon the court's final conclusions, does merit further consideration by this court in this lawsuit. For reasons
pointed out in our original brief, this fact in and of itself
shows the parties to this suit should be held by this court
to have contemplated that the hazard of loss arising from
use of the crossing was closely, not "remotely", connected
with and related to the existence of the pipeline and its
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maintenance. Moreover, the basis for our assertion lies
not alone in the difference between one and one-half miles
and the several hundred miles examples of the court. It
lies in the very realistic difference between contracting
for indemnity as to the hazard of an easily foreseeable
crossing accident at this crossing which was, for practical
purposes, inseparably related to the pipeline - as distinguished from contracting for indemnity as to the hazards
of some accident whose relationship to the pipeline was
so tenuous, and whose forseeability was so difficult, that
ordinary people would not consider it as an added hazard
created by the pipeline at all. In short, there is no logical
legal reason (nor for that matter even a geographical
basis) for a conclusion that because an accident in
Chicago or Salt Lake is "remote", so also is one occurring on the crossing where Stacey was hurt in the circumstances here.
ARGUMENT POINT II
Appellant's Points 3 and 4 set forth in its Petition
for Rehearing also lend themselves to discussion simultaneously. Both these points concern the court's holding
that the indemnity language of the deed here involved
did not sufficiently express a clear and unequivocal intention to provide indemnity to the appellant at the hands of
respondent for losses due to appellant's negligence. At
the outset of the discussion of this point, we are impelled
to say this court has apparently misconceived the nature
of appellant's position on an important phase of this
problem. ·That phase is the matter of whether or not
there were discussions or negotiations between appellant
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and respondent prior to execution and delivery of the
deed with regard to indemnity in favor of appellant
for losses occasioned by "negligence" of the appellant.
This court said in the third full paragraph on page 3
of its opinion as follows:
"This is pointed up by the plaintiff's own
argument. It asserts that the parties in fact discussed the possibility of loss arising from its negligence, and that the agreement was intended to
cover such an eventuality. Assuming it to be true
that they discussed the matter, this does not
strengthen the plaintiff's position, nor does it impair the validity of the trial court's conclusion. If
the matter was discussed and was thus in the
minds of the parties, this would affirm with greater emphasis that the Union Pacific should have
expressly so stated in the contract.
" (italics
added)
The court's statement quoted above seems to us to be
premised on the assumption that appellant's position
throughout the course of this litigation has been to the
effect both appellant and respondent talked about indemnity for losses arising from Union Pacific's negligence entirely separately and as a different and distinct
subject for discussion than indemnity to Union Pacific
in any and all circumstances where the loss to Union Pacific resulted in any way whatsoever from the existence
or maintenance of the pipeline. Such has never been
Union Pacific's position in this case. To the contrary of
the court's assumption, appellant has contended that
the negotiations or discussions between the parties hereto
prior to the execution and delivery of the deed occurred
in only two ways: (a) By means of the general oral dis-
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cussions evidenced by plaintiffs response to defendant's
request for admission No. 9; and {b) By means of the
submission to respondent of the precise form of indemnity language to be used in the deed, with the correspondence pertaining thereto. (R. 49, 50, 51, 56, 57, 58 and
164). And the important and significant fact with regard
to these negotiations or discussions is this: It was the
purpose of both Union Pacific and El Paso to provide
for indemnity to Union Pacific from El Paso as to losses
arising from the existence or maintenance of the pipeline, or other activities of El Paso in connection therewith specified in the deed, without distinction whatsoever
as to other contributing factors to such losses, including
negligence of the Railroad Company, so long as those
losses were in any way whatsoever due to the existence
of the pipeline. What else does the phrase "howsoever
caused" used in the deed really mean? .Never has appellant
contended that there were discussions between the parties
in which the specific words "negligence of Union Pacific"
were used. Appellant's position is and always has been
that the negotiations and discussions consisted, in substance, of appellant's advice to respondent to the effect
that Union Pacific expected to be as thoroughly free
from risk of loss after the pipeline was constructed as
it was before the same existed; and the submission to
respondent by appellant of the precise language of indemnity eventually to be used in the deed, which language was
literally sufficient to accomplish that purpose absolutely.
The very absence of negotiation or discussion in which
the specific term "negligence" was used seems to us the
most persuasive possible reason supporting appellant's
argument that the language used in the deed was intend-
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ed to cover all losses-not merely those losses occasioned
Union Pacific independently of its own negligence. Both
these parties knew how to say there would be no indemnity for losses due to Union Pacific negligence had they
desired to so agree. The negotiations, as outlined above,
reveal absolutely no purpose whatever on the part of
those who conducted them to draw some distinction based
on any determination (subsequently perhaps to be made
by some unknown court or unknown jury) that any given
loss was due to negligence of the Railroad Company. Nor
does the language used in the deed evidence any such
purpose. The purpose was and remains to provide for
indemnity in favor of Union Pacific whenever a given
loss was in "any way whatsoever due to" the existence
or maintenance of the pipeline. The fact that such
losses might also be due in part to negligence of the appellant was so wholly irrelevant to the arrangement these
parties were consumating that it neither merited nor
received special mention containing the word "negligence." Accordingly, this court's seeming reliance on
the notion that there were specific discussions of some
sort of distinction drawn by the parties as between those
losses occasioned, in part, by railroad negligence and
other types of losses, yet without expression of that distinction in the deed, is unfounded in fact and unsupported
by the record before this court. ·This was never a case
in which appellant and respondent divided the losses
which might occur due to the existence of the pipeline into
two separate parts: (a) those due to railroad negligence
and (b) those occurring without railroad negligence; and
then (c) described those two factors separately in the
deed. It was instead a case in which the parties dealt with
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the sum of (a) and ( b) above in one fell swoop rather
than in pieces. And treatment of all such losses as a
whole, rather than breaking the whole in pieces, evidences
no intent to leave out one of the pieces. Nor does the
decision of this court in Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 U. (2d)
204, 398 P.(2d) 207, relied upon by the court in its footnote No. 4, decide otherwise. One who reads that case
carefully will search in vain for even a hint that parties
may not contract for indemnity as to losses occasioned
by the indemnitee's own negligence without stating that
proposition separately from indemnity for other losses.
We do not intend to repeat all the argument made
rn our original brief. But it should be added here the
only case from Wyoming discovered by either party to
this lawsuit dealing with the question of whether or not
indemnity language is sufficient to cover losses occasioned by the indemnitee's own negligence without
specific mention of that word or its equivalent in the
indemnity provision is the case of C. & N.W. Railway
Company vs. Rissler, 184 F.Supp. 98. The deed involved
in this lawsuit conveyed an interest in real estate in
Wyoming. Its acceptance by respondent was evidenced
and completed solely by recordation by respondent of
that deed in a County Recorder's office in Wyoming
and use of the easement areas in Wyoming. That acceptance, in Wyo ming, first bound respondent to any
contractual indemnity liability. Stacey's accident occurred im Wyoming. Can there be any dispute that the
law of Wyoming governs interpretation of the meaning
and effect of the indemnity provision under these circumstances despite that fact Stacey's suit was brought

14
in Utah and the current suit was brought in Utah state
courts~ Restatement of Conflict of La\vs, Sec. 214:, Sec.
311, Sec. 312, Sec. 323, Sec. 325, Sec. 332 (f), and Sec.
346; Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn. vs.
Baldridge (10th Circ.) 70 F. (2d) 236; Heflebower vs.
Sand, 71 F. Supp. 607, syllabus points #1, 2, and 3, at
pages 609 and 610; J uden vs. Southeast Missouri
Tel. Co. (Mo.), 235 S.\V. (2d) 360, syllabus point 1, at
page 363. The court's assertion in its majority opinion
that no clearly and unequivocally expressed intention
to indemnify Union Pacific against the consequences of
its own negligence is to be found in the language of
indemnity here presented because
"it would have been easy enough to use that
very language and to thus make that intent clear
and unmistakable, which was not done here,"
is wholly inconsistent with the law of \Vyoming, shown
by the Rissler decision, to the effect that no such specific
use of the word "negligence" or its equivalent is necessary in order to make such intent clear and unmistakable.
In the absence of some explanation or even mention by
this court as to why it has refused to follow the law of
\Vyoming in this regard, we cannot but conclude the
court overlooked this important matter.
Lastly in this connection appellant desires to ask
the court to reconsider the real validity of some of the
remarks made near the top of page 3 of its opinion.
The court said:
''
each liarty is entitlt>d to assume that
the other intends to conduct himself as a reason-
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able and prudent person ... , which presupposes
that he will commit no wrongful act nor be guilty
of negligence."
Whatever the merits of such a doctrine in situations
such as were involved in the cases cited by the court
in its footnote #2, it is not a principle which has absolutely universal application even in tort cases. Please
see Lillie vs. Thompson, Trustee, 332 U.S. 459, 92 L.Ed.
73, 68 Sup. Ct. 140; Restatement of Torts (2d), Sec.
302 A, Comment ( c) ; Sec. 302 B, Comment ( e). And
the view that two parties contracting for indemnity do
so "presupposing" the indemnitee will "commit no
wrongful act nor be guilty of negligence" is scarcely
realistic. How can such an assumed "presupposition"
be squared with the actual fact that in the case at bar
the parties specifically provided for indemnity to Union
Pacific for amounts paid for liability to third persons,
not parties to the agreement, as to whom Union Pacific
would not even be legally liable unless found to be
negligent or at fault in some way' How can such a
"presupposition" be squared with the hundreds of cases
in which courts have found the parties did by contract
provide for indemnity for losses due to an indemnitee's
own negligence? How can such a "presupposition" be
reconciled with the realities of liability insurance purchased by almost everyone? Do insurance companies
really sell, and automobile owners and others really buy,
liability insurance "presupposing" the buyer will never
be guilty of negligence? Is the frame of mind of those
entering indemnity agreements so wholly different than
those involved in the insurance analogy mentioned above
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as to justify this court's reliance in a contract case on
a very general tort principle which ha.s limited application even in its own tort field f
The court also said :
.
"A closely related proposition pertinent here
is that the law does not look with favor upon one
exacting a covenant to relieve himself of the basic
duty which the law imposes on everyone: that of
using due care for the safety of himself and
others. This would tend to encourage carelessness and would not be salutary either for the person seeking to protect himself or for those whose
safety may be hazarded by his conduct."
As to these statements by the court we suggest the following: (1) An indemnity agreement such as here involved did not even purport to relieve appellant of the
responsibility of exercising due care. More, it did not
even purport to relieve appellant of a legal duty to
respond in damages to Stacey. Its real effect, as is
pointed out in Cozzi vs. Owens Corning Fiber Glass
Corp. (N.J.) 164 A.(2d) 69, was to allocate as between
Union Pacific and El Paso the responsibility for providing the resources, whether by contractual liability
insurance or by other means, for paying losses both
knew would inevitably someday occur. (2) The notion
that indemnity contracts tend to encourage carelessness
is also unrealistic. Is the fact that some justices of this
court undoubtedly carry liability insurance as automobile owners one which "tends to encourage carelessness"
on their part 1 At least, is any such tendency of real
legal moment for any purpose 1 And even if it is, of
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what real importance is that tendency in a case such
as this? The negligence relied upon by Stacey in his
suit against Union Pacific was claimed and alleged to
exist in the conduct of appellant's train service employes. Is it really to be supposed in common sense
that those employes tended to be less careful than they
otherwise would have been simply because an indemnity
agreement, which none of them had ever even heard
existed, may have afforded their employer indemnity
relief against loss? Please see the remarks of Messrs.
Harper and James, Vol. 2, The Law of Torts, page 771
et seq., on the subject of the effect of liability insurance
on the traditional "objective of tort law" to deter unreasonably dangerous conduct and to promote the taking
of reasonable precautions. On this particular subject
matter is there any real difference between liability
insurance and an indemnity agreement? (3) Is it appropriate today for courts to "look with disfavor" upon
indemnity agreements covering the indemnitee's negligence? If so, why? Is there anything antisocial or immoral in our courts allowing two corporations such as
are parties here to decide between themselves at whose
risk certain losses shall be borne irrespective of whose
"negligence proximately caused" those losses T If there
is something inherently antisocial about such an agreement, what makes it so in the present climate of tort
liability? In all good faith, we say to the court its
remark that "the law does not look with favor" is unsound in principle and inconsistent with modern indemnity cases cited in our previous briefs. Please see the
Cozzi case cited supra at page 16 hereof.
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ARGUMENT POINT III
In support of Point 5 of this Petition for Rehearing
we point out this court relies upon Vinnell Company, Inc.
vs. Pac. Elec. Ry. Co. (Calif.), 340 P.(2d) 604, in its footnote 4; and upon Southern Pacific Co. vs. Layman
(Ore.), 145 P.(2d) 295, in its footnote 5, to support its
decision. The Vinnell case is no longer followed slavishly even in California. Please see Harvey Machine Co.,
Inc. vs. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc. (1960) (Calif.), 353 P.(2d)
924, cited in appellant's "Reply Brief." The Layman
case seems to us to afford an even more precarious
foundation for decision in view of what the Oregon
Supreme Court, who wrote it, later said about it and
about indemnity agreements between large corporations
in Southern Pacific Co. vs. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc.
(Ore.), 338 P. ( 2d) 665, at 672 et seq. vVhatever disposition is finally made of the case at bar, we ask this court
to reconsider whether or not it really wishes the law of
this state pertaining to contracts for indemnity to be
left, as the court's footnotes now indicate, in reliance
upon decisions of other jurisdictions whose absolutism
is rejected at least in part even by the courts of the
authoring states; and also in a general condition wholly
inconsistent with the current judicial thought on indemnity law.
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CONCLUSION
Counsel for appellant are fully aware this court
does not favor unwarranted use of the court's rehearing
procedure. We intend no disregard of the court's understandable desire to avoid needless decisions on petitions
for rehearing; nor do we intend any offense or disrespect
to this court by what is said in this brief. However, for
the reasons pointed out herein, we strongly urge that
this important case deserves reconsideration and reversal of the judgment below. We have neither the right
nor the desire simply to quarrel with this court's opinion.
But appellant's legal privilege to invite further thought
by this court on the issues presented in this lawsuit is
hereby invoked.
Respectfully submitted,

BRYAN P. LEVERICH
A. U. MINER
HOWARD F. CORAY
SCOTT M. MATHESON
NORMAN W. KETTNER

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appell.ant

10 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

